extensive use of sympathy as a pathological concept in his writings, drawing on earlier usage within the learned medical tradition. 4 But what Galen does not do is privilege, at least explicitly, the relationship between the mind and the body as a site of sympathy. Moreover, he is downright wary of implicating the psychē in the sympathetic networks that he maps onto a well-defined anatomical landscape. In this paper, I try to account for Galen's bipolar relationship to sympathy in the realm of mental disturbance by asking the following questions: What conceptual and explanatory work does sympathy do for Galen in this realm? Why is he so reluctant to apply it to the soul?
Taking up these inquiries has the advantage of yielding an unfamiliar angle on Galen's psychology and, more specifically, his psychopathology. These topics have attracted a good deal of attention in recent years.
5 Yet analyses of Galen's views on the soul and its relationship to the body have been mostly confined to the obviously psychological works, such as his massive, mid-career opus the Doctrines of Plato and Hippocrates and the aforementioned That the Faculties of the Soul Follow the Mixtures of the Body. The concept of sympathy brings us into the territory of other texts, most notably On the Affected Parts, where the lines between the brain, the rest of the body, and the soul intersect and fail to intersect in ways that shed new light on Galen's ideas about how the body disrupts mental functions.
The inquiry undertaken here also has repercussions for the larger question of the relationship between the mind or soul and the body in antiquity. One of the aspects of sympathy that makes it so intriguing is that the concept posits an affective connection without spelling out how that connection occurs or what ground joins the partners. The open-ended nature of sympathy emerges as particularly significant when the partners are the body and the soul or the mind, for the reason that it can be difficult to grasp the nature of the space where these entities meet (think of the enigmatic pineal gland in the writings of Descartes). In some cases, the language of sympathy is no more than an acknowledgment that two entities, say the body and the
